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INTRODUCTION
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power . . . .
—U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3
In the United States, federal law is made through a process of bicameralism and
presentment: legislation must be approved by both houses of Congress and signed
by the President before becoming law.1 Bicameralism and presentment are frequently
treated as the exclusive means by which federal law may be created. As the Supreme
Court put it in INS v. Chadha,2 bicameralism and presentment constitute the “single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” by which the legislative
power of the federal government may be exercised.3 For the Framers, it was “beyond
doubt that lawmaking was a power to be shared by both Houses and the President.”4
But despite such sweeping claims, it is clear that not all federal law is required
to undergo the strictures of bicameralism and presentment. Constitutional amendments, for example, must be approved by Congress and ratified by three-quarters of
the states but need not be presented to the President to take effect.5
This Article argues that the Constitution provides yet another mechanism for the
creation of federal law without presentment. Under the Compact Clause,6 Congress is
authorized to consent to compacts among the states.7 Further, congressional consent to
state compacts in certain contexts transforms the compacts from state law into federal
law.8 Relying on the Constitution’s text, structure, and history, as well as Supreme
Court jurisprudence, this Article shows that presidential presentment is not necessary
1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3
Id. at 951.
4
Id. at 947.
5
See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920) (“At an early day this court settled that
the submission of a constitutional amendment did not require the action of the President.”);
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379, 382 (1798) (rejecting the argument that
the Eleventh Amendment was invalid because it was never submitted to the President for his
approval).
6
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded,
or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”).
7
Id.
8
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) (“[W]here Congress has authorized the States
to enter into a cooperative agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an
appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States’
agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.”).
2
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for Congress to exercise its consent power under the Compact Clause. The result is
an alternative mechanism for federal lawmaking that, in certain cases, precludes an
approval role for the President.
At first glance, it might appear uncontroversial that no presidential approval is
required for Congress to consent to state compacts under the Compact Clause. After
all, the Clause speaks only of congressional consent and gives no indication that
presidential approval might also be required.9 Moreover, the first Supreme Court case
to interpret the Compact Clause noted that “the constitution makes no provision respecting the mode or form in which the consent of Congress is to be signified, very
properly leaving that matter to the wisdom of that body, to be decided upon according
to the ordinary rules of law, and of right reason.”10 But other constitutional provisions
complicate matters. The Presentment Clause11 and the Order, Resolution, and Vote
(ORV) Clause12 seemingly require all congressional actions that require bicameral
approval to be channeled through the traditional legislative process, which requires
presentment to the President for approval or veto.13 If that were the case, Congress
could not consent to state compacts without also seeking presidential approval.
Compelling evidence, however, suggests that the scope of the Presentment and
ORV Clauses is not so broad. Though we provide a fuller account of this evidence
later in the Article,14 we provide a brief sketch here.
Not all congressional actions that require bicameral approval—for example, the
proposal of constitutional amendments pursuant to Article V15—are subject to the
presentment requirement.16 Further, the Supreme Court declared in Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission17 that state executives
9

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . .
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .” (emphasis added)).
10
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 36 (1823).
11
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President
of the United States . . . .”).
12
Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (“Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States . . . .”).
13
See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
14
See discussion infra Sections II.F, G.
15
U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . .”).
16
See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920) (“At an early day this court settled that the
submission of a constitutional amendment did not require the action of the President.”);
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 379, 382 (1798) (rejecting the argument that the
Eleventh Amendment was invalid because it was never submitted to the President for his approval). Early constitutional practice establishes the same point: the First Congress did not submit
the proposed Bill of Rights to President Washington before sending the amendments to the state
legislatures for ratification. RICHARD BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE
LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 44 (1993).
17
135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
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are precluded from playing any role when the Constitution assigns to a state legislature “a ratifying, electoral, or consenting function.”18 Though the Court’s comments
in Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission concerned the consenting function
of a state legislature under Article IV, Section 3,19 there is no material difference
between the consent requirement imposed upon state legislatures by Article IV, Section
3 and the consent requirement imposed upon Congress by the Compact Clause.20 In
both cases, the Constitution vests the power to consent to a given action in a legislative body, to the exclusion of the executive.21 The power to consent to interstate
compacts belongs to Congress alone; it is not shared with the President.22
In addition to being constitutionally permissible,23 federal lawmaking through
the Compact Clause has a number of normatively attractive features. First, in the face
of regional polarization that has often hampered Congress’s ability to craft nationwide legislation addressing important issues, interstate compacts provide a means
for states to partner with Congress to address those issues on a regional, rather than
national, basis. In other words, interstate compacts promote federalism: they enable
a form of decentralized decision-making that promotes “autonomy, democracy, and
freedom” and “seeks to empower geographically-based minorities in a political manner.”24 Such an approach allows for a “sensitivity to geographically-based sub-national
majorities” so that different interests can be accommodated without the need for a
national resolution or consensus on important issues.25 Some recent discussions about
health reform reflect that approach, leaving for state-based flexibility some critical issues upon which a national consensus might not exist and for which subsidiarity (state
or local autonomy) might be an appropriate mode of resolution or compromise.26
Second, interstate compacts can serve as an important vehicle for promoting
state autonomy and experimentation.27 The Compact Clause enables states to solve
18

Id. at 2667.
Id. at 2668.
20
Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress
into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without
the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.” (emphasis
added)), with id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .” (emphasis added)).
21
See id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
22
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
23
Id.
24
James F. Blumstein, Federalism and Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1252–53 (1994).
25
Id. at 1259.
26
Robert Jackel & Alex Green, How Treaties Between States Could Keep Obamacare
Alive, ATLANTIC (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/inter
state-compacts-save-obamacare/515604/ [https://perma.cc/v6AJ-SA2L].
27
See id. Cf. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of Federal
Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205, 211 (1997) (asserting that “the Constitution
19

2019]

STATE EMPOWERMENT AND THE COMPACT CLAUSE

779

certain types of problems that involve other states, such as healthcare reform, even
in the face of political gridlock between Congress and the President. Interstate compacts can also reinvigorate state policy by permitting states to experiment with
alternative regulatory structures. By allowing states to tailor their systems to regional
differences and experiment with different approaches to public policy, compacts can
provide exploratory laboratories for innovation, allowing states to observe their
peers’ successes and failures and improve their own policies, and by affording states
a “right-to-try.”
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I describes the scope of the Compact
Clause, setting forth limitations on the types of compacts that are permitted under
the Compact Clause.28 Part II then argues that presidential approval is not necessary
for Congress to exercise its consent power under the Compact Clause and briefly explores the implications of our argument, demonstrating that interstate compacts provide
a socially desirable alternative to congressional legislation that enables states and
Congress to address important societal problems without involving the President.29
I. THE SCOPE OF THE COMPACT CLAUSE
This Section will focus on the historical origins of the Compact Clause,30 the legal
development of the Compact Clause,31 and examples of how the Compact Clause has
furthered cooperative federalism.32
A. The Historical Origins of the Compact Clause
Little legislative history exists about the meaning and purpose of the Compact
Clause.33 Madison described Article 1, Section 10, Clause 3 as “within reasonings
which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed
over without remark.”34 The scope and nature of the Compact Clause, however, may
be discerned by an examination of the British Government’s role in approving
compacts during the colonial period,35 Congress’s role in approving compacts under
does not express a preference for Congress to delegate federal power to states” in the name
of federalism).
28
See discussion infra Part I.
29
See discussion infra Part II.
30
See discussion infra Section I.A.
31
See discussion infra Section I.B.
32
See discussion infra Section I.B.2.
33
See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1978) (“The
records of the Constitutional Convention, however, are barren of any clue as to the precise contours of the agreements and compacts governed by the Compact Clause.”); see also Michael
S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 68 MO. L. REV. 285, 308–15 (2003).
34
U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 461 n.11 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 299, 302
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
35
See discussion infra Section I.A.1.
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the Articles of Confederation,36 and the debates relating to Article 1, Section 10 during
the Constitutional Convention.37
1. Compacts in the Colonial Period
As Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis noted in their seminal paper examining the history and potential uses of the Compact Clause, the clause “has its roots deep
in colonial history.”38 Most colonial charters were inevitably “vague and expansive”
resulting in a number of boundary disputes.39 To resolve a boundary dispute, colonies
could avail themselves of one of two methods: negotiations through a joint commission that required the Crown’s consent to go into effect or referring the dispute to
a Royal Commission that would sort out the issue.40
Post-Revolution, however, a number of the boundary disputes remained unsettled.41 Even though the Founding generation viewed states as independent sovereigns, the Articles of Confederation still reserved power for Congress to regulate
relations between states and with outside sovereigns.42 For example, two provisions
precluded states: (i) from sending or receiving ambassadors from a foreign state,43
and (ii) from entering into alliances with other states without Congress’s consent.44
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress would be the final arbiter of state
boundary disputes.45 The purpose of congressional power in the area of foreign affairs was to promote stability and cohesion amongst competing political powers.46
2. Compacts Under the Articles of Confederation
Under the Articles of Confederation, four compacts were enacted: two addressing
boundary disputes,47 a boundary dispute and navigation agreement,48 and a regulatory
compact.49 The regulatory compact was the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay
36

See discussion infra Section I.A.2.
See discussion infra Section I.A.3.
38
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A
Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 692 (1925).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 692–93.
41
See id. at 693.
42
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 24 (2005); see also
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II, para. 1 (“Each State retains its Sovereignty,
freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”).
43
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1.
44
Id. art. VI, para. 2.
45
See id. art. IX, para. 2.
46
See Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 38, at 693–94.
47
See id. at 732–34.
48
See id. at 734.
49
See id.
37
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Navigation and Trade Agreement, enacted by Maryland and Virginia to help cooperate
in their management of shared waters.50 Congress did not expressly approve this
compact, yet its validity under Article VI of the Articles of Confederation was never
publicly questioned.51
When Maryland ratified the compact, the Maryland legislature proposed that
Delaware and Pennsylvania be invited to participate in further negotiations relating
to “interstate commercial regulations.”52 In response, Virginia ratified the agreement
and called upon all thirteen states to meet in Annapolis in 1786 to draft uniform
commercial laws.53 Nine states appointed representatives, although only five states
participated.54 In Annapolis, the delegates approved a resolution requesting that Congress assemble a convention in Philadelphia, to start in May 1787, to examine and
propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation.55 In response, Congress approved a resolution on February 21, 1787, calling for the proposed convention.56 As
we know, attendees elected to scrap the Articles of Confederation, reformulating the
nature of the union among the states and empowering a national government to address
the contemporary problems of the American states by creating an American republic.57
3. Debates at the Constitutional Convention
At the Philadelphia Convention, the Framers largely adopted the Articles of Confederation’s ban on interstate and foreign compacts, paring back the requirements
for describing the proposed compact.58 Read broadly, this prohibition could prevent
50

JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AGREEMENTS 6–7 (2d ed. 2012).
51
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 461 n.10 (1978) (“[T]he
Virginia-Maryland Compact of 1785, which governed navigation and fishing rights in the
Potomac River, the Pocomoke River, and the Chesapeake Bay, did not receive congressional
approval, yet no question concerning its validity under Art. VI ever arose.”). Professors
Frankfurter and Landis suggested that Madison appears to have privately believed the VirginiaMaryland Compact infringed upon federal power, noting that “[i]n other cases the [federal]
[authority] was violated by Treaties & wars . . . . by compacts [without] the consent of Congress
as between [Pennsylvania] and [New] Jersey, and between [Virginia] and [Maryland].”
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 38, at 694 n.36. Yet, for reasons we shall see, Madison was
more predisposed to find a violation of Federal prerogative and thus his views were unrepresentative of the general beliefs of the Framers and the population at large at the adoption
of the United States Constitution.
52
See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 50, at 7.
53
See id.
54
See id.
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
For an examination of the creation of the American Republic, see AMAR, supra note
42, at 25–53.
58
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, with ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781,
art. VI, para. 2.
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State A from selling property within State B to the government of State B, or it could
prevent two states from agreeing to build a bridge over a river running between the
two states. The Supreme Court has rejected such a broad interpretation of the Clause,
believing that such an interpretation would unduly burden the states.59
Before we analyze how the Court has interpreted the Compact Clause, it is important to examine the debates surrounding the Compact Clause, and Article I, Section
10 more broadly, to better understand their role in our constitutional system.
Article I, Section 10 is composed of three clauses.60 Whereas the first clause contains blanket prohibitions,61 the latter two contain conditional bans.62 As explained
below, the conditional prohibitions are best understood as mechanisms to protect
federal interests against possible state encroachment.63
One distinguished scholar, Professor Michael Greve, has proposed that the Compact Clause is a species of the “congressional negative” proposed by James Madison
at the Constitutional Convention.64 While remaining agnostic about whether the Compact Clause is best understood as a form of Madison’s congressional negative, we
note that modern Compact Clause doctrine has developed in a manner consonant
with how Madison’s peers at the Constitutional Convention responded to his proposed congressional negative. As we shall see, Madison’s peers rejected one aspect
of the congressional negative while embracing another,65 and modern Compact
Clause doctrine has done the same.66
Madison’s proposed congressional negative was motivated by two distinct purposes: enabling the federal government to defend itself against state encroachment and
reforming internal state policy.67 The second purpose of Madison’s proposed congressional negative can only be understood in light of his argument in Federalist No. 10
about the nature of factions and extended republics.68 Distilled to its essentials, Madison
argued that the most significant threat to individual liberties was posed by “factions,”
his term for interest groups which promote laws that advantage the group and not the
body politic as a whole.69 Contrary to the then-popular consensus,70 Madison argued
that an ‘extended republic,’ covering a large territory, would better check factions primarily because the expanded geographic scope would make it more challenging to
59

See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518–22 (1893).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
61
Id. § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any . . . .”).
62
Id. § 10, cl. 2–3 (“No State shall without the Consent of the Congress . . . .”).
63
See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
64
See Greve, supra note 33, at 289.
65
See id. at 312–13.
66
See id. at 365–66.
67
See Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 627–28 (1999).
68
Id. at 629.
69
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
70
See Kramer, supra note 67, at 639 (“No one picked up or repeated Madison’s points . . . .
And . . . [he] lost every proposal he made based on it.”).
60
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coordinate actions.71 Additionally, Madison believed corrupt politicians would wilt
on a larger stage.72 Thus, a large national government would better preserve liberty
than the individual states, which might be captured by provincial interests. The implication of this reasoning is twofold—that a national government would better preserve
liberty and that the individual states posed a threat to liberty.
While Madison’s extended republic theory is widely taught,73 political theorists
often fail to appreciate the recentness of Madison’s conclusions when he presented
them to the Constitutional Convention and the negative reception they received from
other attendees.74 Madison likely did not fully develop his ideas about factions until
he composed his “Vices of the Political System of the United States” memorandum
in April 1787.75 In light of his new insights, Madison no longer focused merely on the
states’ ability to enfeeble the national government, as under the Articles of Confederation,76 but on the national government’s ability to improve state governments.77
Madison believed a congressional veto right over all state laws could serve the dual
purpose of protecting federal prerogatives and dissipating the effects of factions in
the states.78 With respect to the second purpose of the congressional negative—
improving internal state policy—Madison’s peers overwhelmingly rejected his proposal
and, importantly, his reasoning.79 But the other purpose motivating Madison’s congressional negative—protecting federal interests—was in fact vindicated in various
constitutional provisions, such as the Compact and Supremacy Clauses.80
At the Convention, Edmund Randolph advocated that the Convention replace
the Articles of Confederation with various congressional powers to defend federal
interests, including Madison’s congressional negative.81 Multiple versions of the
negative were proposed: a limited negative, only intended to protect federal supremacy; a broader negative, which satisfied Madison’s twin goals; a negative lodged in
the Senate alone; a negative lodged in both houses; and a limited negative that only
invalidated laws that interfered with federal interests and required a two-thirds vote
71

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 69, at 83 (James Madison).
See id. at 84 (“The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
states but will be unable to spread . . . through the other states.”).
73
See Kramer, supra note 67, at 612–13.
74
See id. at 612, 615.
75
See id. at 628.
76
See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VIII (requiring the national government to request money from the states rather than implementing a tax to pay its debts).
77
See Kramer, supra note 67, at 628–29.
78
See id. at 627–28.
79
See id. at 648–52.
80
See Greve, supra note 33, at 312, 365–66.
81
Randolph spoke on behalf of the Virginia delegation. His proposal for powers necessary
to the federal government included “the power to defend the nation from foreign invasion, the
capacity to protect member states from one another and from internal rebellions, the ability to
procure benefits that require collective action, the energy to defend itself from encroachments
by the states, and the status of being supreme.” Kramer, supra note 67, at 641.
72
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from each house.82 The convention-goers repeatedly rejected these proposals—they
preferred to leave power to the states.83 In rejecting Madison’s congressional negative,
however, it is evident that the convention-goers primarily rejected the second purpose
of the negative—giving the federal government the power to improve internal state
policy and curb factionalism.84 Though the convention-goers did not adopt Madison’s
negative, they were far more receptive to its original purpose of protecting federal
interests, as demonstrated by the adoption of the Supremacy Clause85 (which gave Congress the power to preempt contrary state laws) and Article I, Section 1086 (which
limits the power of the states to engage in certain activities that pose a unique risk to
federal interests).
Moreover, modern Compact Clause doctrine comports with the convention-goers’
acceptance of the legitimacy of the federal government’s power to protect its own
interests and their corresponding rejection of a broader power to oversee the internal
affairs of the states.87 As explained below, the Court has interpreted the Compact
Clause to require congressional consent only for compacts that threaten federal supremacy but not for other more routine compacts focused on solving state problems.88
In addition to evaluating the Compact Clause against the backdrop of Madison’s
congressional negative, we should also look at the structure of Article I, Section 10’s
three clauses to better understand the Compact Clause. The first clause mixes a number
of blanket prohibitions relating to federal supremacy, such as the Treaty Clause, the ban
on states coining money, and prohibitions designed to cultivate a national market, such
as the Contracts Clause.89 By contrast, clause two, a set of conditional bans, focuses
instead on a states’ ability to “lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s [sic] inspection Laws.”90 As originally interpreted, this clause prohibited the states from laying imposts or duties on
either domestic or foreign imports or exports, leaving the United States as a national
market whose import policies would be determined by the federal government.91
The third clause largely addresses what Professor Akhil Reed Amar has termed
the country’s geostrategic concerns.92 The provisions, like the bulk of the early
82

ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 146–54
(2010). See also Kramer, supra note 67, at 648, 651–52.
83
Kramer, supra note 67, at 648–52.
84
See id. at 649–53.
85
See id. at 652–53 n.180; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
86
See Kramer, supra note 67, at 648; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
87
See Greve, supra note 33, at 365–66.
88
See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
89
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. For a discussion of the contract clause, see JAMES W. ELY,
JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2016).
90
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
91
See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 421 (1827); see also AMAR, supra note 42, at
122–23.
92
See AMAR, supra note 42, at 44.
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Federalist Papers, focused on external threats that gave urgency to ratification, not
internal reforms.93 Uniting against potential foreign adversaries better secured the
states’ citizens’ liberties. As the Founders recognized, “[w]hen England, Wales, and
Scotland were separate kingdoms, military competition between them invited invasion
and foreign intrigue, triggering a heightened domestic militarization that threatened
liberty. The indivisible union of England and Scotland at the outset of the eighteenth
century gave island residents more room to breathe free.”94 If the states did not ratify
the Constitution, Publius and other leading voices believed that internal wars, reminiscent of Continental Europe, were inevitable.95 Further, only as a unified front could
the states exact trade concessions from Europe.96
This general geostrategic vision dictated that no state “keep Troops, or Ships of
War in time of Peace . . . or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay,” without Congress’s consent.97 The United
States would have one military and diplomatic strategy.98 Further, the conditional prohibition of assessing duties of tonnage99 restricted a state’s ability to ban boats from entering ports by restricting a state’s ability to tax instrumentalities of commerce (namely,
boats).100 Otherwise, prominent ports could tax foreign and interstate commerce. Note
that each of these prohibitions deals with encroachment on the federal prerogative.
Similarly, the Compact Clause, also in the third clause of Article I, Section 10,101
should be read as preventing the states from unilaterally interfering with federal interests. As we shall see, this is precisely how the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Compact Clause and why the Court has treated the Foreign Compact Clause differently from the Interstate Compact Clause.102
B. The Legal Development of the Compact Clause
The Supreme Court’s treatment of the Interstate Compact Clause and Foreign
Compact Clause has diverged significantly, with the Court requiring congressional
93

See id. at 44–46.
Id. at 45.
95
See id. at 46.
96
See id. at 47.
97
Id. at 51; U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3.
98
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3.
99
See id.
100
The prohibition allowed the United States to speak with a single voice. See Greve, supra
note 33, at 296 (“For a federal republic . . . the prospect of separate, unsupervised agreements
among its member-states and between a member-state and a foreign nation must constitute
a cause for alarm.”).
101
See U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3.
102
See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1978). Just as
important, the limited number of restrictions and the existence of conditional prohibitions evidence a structure that respected a state’s ability to settle internal affairs and to cooperate with
Congress on compacts that could aid a particular group of states, and more generally, the federal
system’s opportunities for innovation.
94
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consent for any agreement with a foreign nation, even a one-off, oral, gratuitous
promise,103 while only requiring congressional consent for those interstate agreements
that interfere with federal interests.104 As Chief Justice John Marshall recognized in
Barron v. Baltimore,105 the interstate and foreign prohibitions served different purposes: “If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty making
power which is conferred entirely on the general government, if with each other, for
political purposes, they can scarcely fail to interfere with the general purpose and
intent of the constitution.”106 Whereas the first was entirely suspect because of the
treaty-making power, the latter was suspect only to the extent the states united for
political purposes to interfere with the constitutional allotment of power. We will
first examine the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Foreign Compact Clause,107 and
then apply those insights to understand the Supreme Court’s Interstate Compact
Clause jurisprudence.108
1. Congressional Consent Requirement
The Supreme Court first addressed when state agreements with foreign nations
would require Congress’s consent in Holmes v. Jennison.109 The Court had to determine whether the Vermont Governor’s decision to detain an alleged criminal and
turn over custody of the individual to Canadian officials violated the Constitution
for failure to receive congressional consent.110 Recognizing the pervasive role the
federal government has to establish “one-voice” in foreign affairs111 and the explicit
constitutional restrictions on the states’ relations with foreign entities, a plurality of
the Court, led by Chief Justice Taney, construed the congressional consent requirement broadly to prevent states from meddling with the federal government’s foreign
maneuverings.112 Silence on a matter may not indicate apathy but instead may be
103

See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569–70 (1840).
See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 472–73.
105
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
106
See id. at 249.
107
See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
108
See discussion infra Section I.B.1.
109
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
110
See id. at 562.
111
See id. at 570 (noting “Congress [has] the power to regulate commerce; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the laws of nations;
to declare war; to grant letters of marque and reprisal; to raise and support armies; to provide and
maintain a navy. And the President is not only authorized, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, to make treaties; but he also nominates, and by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate appoints ambassadors and other public ministers, through whose agency negotiations are to be made, and treaties concluded. He also receives the ambassadors sent from
foreign countries: and every thing that concerns our foreign relations, that may be used to
preserve peace or to wage war, has been committed to the hands of the federal government”).
112
See id. at 561, 573–76.
104
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considered ambivalence or coolness.113 Although procedural disagreements prevented a majority opinion,114 on remand, the Vermont Supreme Court treated Justice
Taney’s opinion as highly persuasive and freed the prisoner.115 Subsequent courts,
including the Supreme Court, have regarded Taney’s opinion as definitive as well.116
By contrast, starting with Virginia v. Tennessee,117 the Supreme Court has rejected such a capacious consent requirement for interstate compacts.118 Courts have
utilized the states’ quasi-sovereign status vindicated in the Tenth Amendment, without
citing the Tenth Amendment, to help interpret the Compact Clause in much the same
way the Court subsequently invoked the Tenth Amendment to interpret the extent of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power to commandeer the states in New York v. United
States.119 Consistent with our historical analysis earlier, the Court has reinforced its
more limited interpretation of the Compact Clause by citing Justice Story’s observation that “the consent of Congress may be properly required, in order to check any
infringement of the rights of the national government,” but that a total prohibition
on formalized state cooperation would create an unnecessary and textually unrequired mischief.120
Thus, there exists two types of compacts under the Interstate Compact Clause:
(1) compacts that do not require congressional consent,121 which we may term
Common Law Compacts, and (2) compacts that do require congressional consent,122
which we may term Constitutional Compacts. Accordingly, in all Compact Clause
disputes, parties must address the threshold issue of what sort of compact they have
placed before the Court to determine whether the compact is valid.
113

See id. at 574–75.
See Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt. 631, 642 (1840).
115
See id.
116
See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 414 (1886) (“There is no necessity for the
states to enter upon the relations with foreign nations which are necessarily implied in the extradition of fugitives from justice found within the limits of the state, as there is none why they
should in their own name make demand upon foreign nations for the surrender of such fugitives.”); People ex rel. Barlow v. Curtis, 50 N.Y. 321, 325 (1872).
117
148 U.S. 503 (1893).
118
See id. at 517–22.
119
505 U.S. 144, 155–56 (1992) (“These questions can be viewed in either of two ways.
In some cases the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the
powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. In other cases the Court has
sought to determine whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. In a case like these, involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a
power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims
any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred
on Congress.” (internal citations omitted)).
120
Virginia, 148 U.S. at 519–20.
121
See id. at 517–22.
122
See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 573–76 (1840).
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The Court finally formulated a test for determining whether consent to interstate
compacts was required in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission.123 There,
the Court had to determine whether a multistate agreement to divide taxable income
from interstate commerce required congressional consent.124 In marking the distinction
between a Common Law Compact and a Constitutional Compact, the Court stated:
On its face the Multistate Tax Compact contains no provisions that
would enhance the political power of the member States in a
way that encroaches upon the supremacy of the United States.
There well may be some incremental increase in the bargaining
power of the member States quoad the corporations subject to
their respective taxing jurisdictions. Group action in itself may
be more influential than independent actions by the States. But
the test is whether the Compact enhances state power quoad the
National Government.125
Thus, a “Compact [that] enhances state power quoad the National Government,” is a
Constitutional Compact and must receive consent, while a Compact that does not challenge federal supremacy is a Common Law Compact and does not require consent.126
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the constitution makes no provision
respecting the mode or form in which the consent of Congress is to be signified,
very properly leaving that matter to the wisdom of that body, to be decided upon
according to the ordinary rules of law, and of right reason.”127 Thus, in Green v.
Biddle,128 the Court inferred congressional consent to the compact between Virginia
and Kentucky that allowed Kentucky to become a state by Congress’s consent.129 As
the number of compacts has proliferated, Congress has developed a number of ways
to consent to proposed state compacts, including ratifying compacts states have proposed, giving consent in advance to compacts containing certain essential elements,
and granting consent for an indefinite period of time, or for a limited duration.130
123

434 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1978).
Id. at 454.
125
Id. at 472–73.
126
Id.
127
Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85–86 (1823).
128
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
129
See id. at 86–87. The compact between Virginia and Kentucky was entered upon the condition that the federal government, by a certain date, “assent to the erection of the District of
Kentucky into an independent State, and agree, that the proposed State should immediately,
after a certain day, or at some convenient time future thereto, be admitted into the federal Union.”
Id. at 86. Because Congress passed an Act that “after referring to the compact, and the acceptance of it by Kentucky,” declared Congress’s consent “to the erecting of the said District
into a separate and independent State, upon a certain day, and receiving her into the Union,”
the Court found that Congress had consented to the compact itself. Id. at 86–87.
130
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 50, at 54–55.
124
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2. Treatment as Federal Law
The effect of Congress’s consent to an interstate compact is to, in certain circumstances, transform the state compact into federal law.131 The Court first addressed
this issue in a pair of cases involving a bridge over the Ohio River and a compact
between Kentucky and Virginia created at Kentucky’s entrance into the Union as a
state.132 As the Court noted, the Virginia-Kentucky compact provided that “the use and
navigation of the River Ohio, so far as the territory of the proposed State, or the territory
that shall remain within the limits of this Commonwealth lies thereon, shall be free and
common to the citizens of the United States.”133 The Court determined that the compact
“by the sanction of Congress, has become a law of the Union.”134 The Court then
found on this “statutory” basis that a public nuisance suit could be brought to prevent
the reconstruction of the bridge after a storm and to stop the attendant effects of the
bridge on the ease of navigation of taller ships.135 In response to Wheeling I, the bridge
company appealed to Congress to allow the reconstruction of the bridge.136 Congress
responded by passing a law in August 1852, eight months after the Wheeling I holding, legalizing the Wheeling Bridge and displacing the Court’s ruling.137 Pennsylvania
subsequently challenged Congress’s action, but the Court rejected Pennsylvania’s
argument that Congress could not repeal the compact, finding instead that it was like
any other federal statute.138
In Cuyler v. Adams,139 the Court noted that subsequent courts built off the “law of
the Union” doctrine to hold that “the construction of an interstate agreement sanctioned
by Congress under the Compact Clause presents a federal question.”140 Then, buried in
a footnote, the Court explained the evolution of the doctrine. The Court noted that:
[T]he law-of-the-Union doctrine was questioned in People v.
Central R. Co. and in Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co.,” [but that] any doubts as to its continued vitality
were put to rest in Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n v.
Colburn, where the Court stated . . . . that the construction of
such a compact sanctioned by Congress by virtue of Article I,
131

See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (Wheeling II ), 59 U.S. (18 How.)
421 (1855); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (Wheeling I ), 54 U.S. (13 How.)
518, 557–58 (1851).
133
Wheeling I, 54 U.S. at 561.
134
Id. at 566.
135
See id. at 626–27.
136
See Wheeling II, 59 U.S. at 429.
137
Id.
138
See id. at 432.
139
449 U.S. 433 (1981).
140
Id. at 438.
132

790

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 27:775

§ 10, Clause 3 of the Constitution, involves a federal ‘title, right,
privilege or immunity’. . . .141
The Court asserted that the Delaware River holding “reaffirmed the law-of-the-Union
doctrine and the underlying principle that congressional consent can transform interstate
compacts into federal law.”142 The Court then established the modern two-part test, “But
[1] where Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative agreement, and
[2] where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal
law under the Compact Clause.”143 Thus, the threshold inquiry is whether the subject
of the compact relates to one of the federal government’s sources of power.144 If a
source of power can be found, such as the treaty-making power or the Commerce
Clause, then congressional consent will transform the compact into federal law.145
The Court has subsequently reaffirmed the Cuyler test.146 There does seem to be an
appropriate symmetry at work. Consent is only required where the compact encroaches
upon federal power,147 such as in the case of the Dormant Commerce Clause,148 foreign
affairs,149 or in the case of conflict or preemption.150 These areas are appropriate for
141

Id. at 439 n.7 (citations omitted).
Id.
143
Id. at 440.
144
See id.
145
As a corollary, for a Constitutional Compact, a state’s failure to obtain Congress’s consent
renders the agreement void. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518–19. While the dissenters did not outright reject the majority’s position, they questioned whether the previous
cases had squarely held that consent transforms compacts into federal law and derided the lack
of rationale put forward. See Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 450 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
146
Under the Compact Clause, two States may not conclude an agreement
such as the Pecos River Compact without the consent of the United States
Congress. However, once given, congressional consent transforms an
interstate compact within this Clause into a law of the United States. One
consequence of this metamorphosis is that, unless the compact to
which Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court
may order relief inconsistent with its express terms.
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983) (citations omitted) (quoting Cuyler, 449 U.S.
at 438). See also New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 811 (1998) (“Indeed, congressional
consent ‘transforms an interstate compact within [the Compact] Clause into a law of the United
States’. . . Just as if a court were addressing a federal statute, then, the ‘first and last order of business’ of a court addressing an approved interstate compact ‘is interpreting the compact.’”) (citations omitted) (first quoting Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 438; and then quoting Texas, 462 U.S. at
567–68).
147
See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978).
148
See New York State Dairy Foods, Inc. v. Ne. Dairy Compact Com’n, 198 F.3d 1, 3,
8–9 (1st Cir. 1999).
149
See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840).
150
NYSA-ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm’n, 732 F.2d 202, 298 (2d
Cir. 1984).
142
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federal legislation and thus compacts in these areas are deemed to be federal in character.151 Since Cuyler, in sum, a Constitutional Compact is (and should be) considered
federal law.152 The Court has recognized that Congress may put conditions upon its
consent to compacts.153 One such condition may be the ability to “alter, amend or repeal” the nature of the consent.154 If such a compact is considered state (as distinct from
federal) law, then that suggests that Congress can directly modify state law, much
further than even Madison envisioned through his proposed congressional negative.
Instead, Constitutional Compacts should be regarded as contracts between two
or more states and the federal government—a position the Supreme Court has recognized for years.155 The contract is formed in one of two ways: either (1) the involved
states each enact the law creating the compact and the federal government gives consent with certain conditions or (2) the federal government gives consent and the states
enact laws in conformity with the federal requirements.156
If states enact laws to create a compact and Congress consents to the compact
in a resolution with requirements inconsistent with the original state plan, the states
are not bound to follow the conditions.157 Rather, a compact has not been formed. In
order to actually form the compact, each state would have to amend its previous law
to conform to Congress’s requirements.158 Any other view of a compact’s status would
run into the anti-commandeering principle.
That a Constitutional Compact is a contract with the federal government, and thus
a form of federal law, follows from the anti-commandeering principle.159 Congress
151

Id.
Some commentators have called into question Cuyler’s ruling. See, e.g., L. Mark Eichorn,
Note, Cuyler v. Adams and the Characterization of Compact Law, 77 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1404–10 (1991) (arguing that Congressional consent should not transform a compact into
federal law because Congress is “regulating” the states, not the underlying activity). As the
discussion in text indicates, we disagree with Mr. Eichorn’s position on Cuyler.
153
See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148 (1937) (noting that Congress
may impose conditions upon its consent); see also Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 271–76
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (finding that Congress validly reserved its right to “alter, amend or repeal” its
consent to the compact creating the New York Port Authority). In particular, the Court found
that Congress could validly use this provision to conduct oversight of the Authority’s operations. The Court created a rule that:
[I]f a particular compact happens to be operational in nature (as exemplified by the compact creating the Authority) as opposed to one static
in nature (as exemplified by an agreement to settle a disputed boundary
line, an act which necessarily dies at the moment of its birth), Congress
is not without power to control the conduct of the former.
Id. at 273.
154
See Tobin, 306 F.2d at 271.
155
See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co. (Wheeling II ), 59 U.S. (18 How.)
421, 433 (1855).
156
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 441 (1980).
157
See Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. at 148–49.
158
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
159
The anti-commandeering principle was initially established in the Commerce Clause
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does not have power “to issue orders directly to the States[;]” the anti-commandeering
doctrine recognizes and protects a reserved, sovereign power of the states—not having
Congress “issue direct orders to the governments of the States.”160 Since the agreement reflected by the compact is “in the nature of a contract,”161 that could pose a
problem when the federal government seeks to modify the compact unilaterally. If the
compact were a state-law contract between states, then the federal government would
be constrained in its ability to amend its consent pursuant to a reservation of power.
Under the anti-commandeering principle, the federal government cannot commandeer
either the state legislature into changing the law or the state executive into enforcing a
new provision.162 Further, the states would be entering into a contract without “clear
notice” protection for changes to the relational contract, something prohibited in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.163 If, however, Constitutional
Compacts are seen as federal laws, knowingly and voluntarily entered into by the
states, then states can fairly enter into compacts, protected by the anti-commandeering
principle to protect their sovereignty as they cooperate with the federal government.164
II. SHOULD THE COMPACT CLAUSE BE SUBJECT TO PRESENTMENT?
The previous Part described how the Compact Clause could be used to create
agreements between states as an avenue for major legislative initiatives, such as
healthcare reform. Based on historical analysis and understanding,165 such a compact
would require congressional consent,166 and upon congressional consent should be
treated as federal law.167 This Part argues that congressional consent in this context
context. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925, 935
(1997). It was subsequently applied, in a functional manner in the Spending Clause context. See
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012); James F.
Blumstein, Enforcing Limits on the Affordable Care Act’s Mandated Medicaid Expansion: The
Coercion Principle and the Clear Notice Rule, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 67, 67 (2011–2012). Most
recently, the anti-commandeering principle has been described in broad, generalized terms. See
Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018) (noting that Congress
does not have power “to issue orders directly to the States”).
160
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475–76 (2018).
161
NFIB, 567 U.S. at 577. See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 17 (1984); Blumstein, supra note 159, at 71.
162
See New York, 505 U.S. at 161; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
163
See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 638 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part). Justice Ginsburg specifically
disagreed with the Chief Justice’s argument that Congress must notify States of potential
Medicaid changes years in advance.
164
For a recent invocation and explanation of the anti-commandeering principle, see
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476–77 (2018). Notably, the Court in Murphy did not suggest that the
principle is limited to the Commerce Clause or the spending power, which are both previous
areas of application.
165
See discussion supra Section I.A.
166
See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
167
See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
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would not require presentment—Congress could consent without involvement from
the executive.168
A. The Constitution, State Legislatures, and Consent
Although no case has ever addressed whether the Constitution subjects congressional consent under the Compact Clause to presentment, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the role of state legislatures in our Constitutional order suggests that it does
not.169 We now examine the Supreme Court’s “state legislature” jurisprudence and
draw out the implications for congressional consent under the Compact Clause.170
The Court has addressed the validity of using the referendum process in the context of both congressional redistricting and ratification of a constitutional amendment.171 For congressional redistricting, the Supreme Court has held that states can
subject redistricting to the referendum process.172 For ratification, however, the Court
has held that subjecting the legislature’s approval of a constitutional amendment to
ratification by the people in a referendum was contrary to Article V.173 Importantly, for
our purposes, the Court discussed the nature of the legislative acts at issue, shedding
light on the legislative nature of “consent.”
In State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant,174 a citizen brought suit seeking to
force state election officials to disregard a state referendum disapproving recently
drawn congressional districts.175 The Constitution empowers state legislatures to set
the time, place, and manner by which representatives and senators are elected.176
Under Ohio law, however, citizens could subject recently passed legislation to a
referendum by convincing six percent of the voting population to sign a petition.177
Prior to the referendum, the law would not be put into effect, and could only go into
effect if approved by the people.178 In this instance, after Ohio’s legislature established
new districting, which the Governor approved, the new scheme failed to receive a
majority of votes cast in the referendum.179 The plaintiff challenged the validity of
168

See discussion infra Part II.
See infra notes 171–204 and accompanying text.
170
See infra notes 171–204 and accompanying text.
171
See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920) (addressing the use of a referendum for
the ratification of a constitutional amendment); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S.
565, 566–67 (1916) (addressing the use of a referendum for congressional redistricting).
172
See Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 568.
173
See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 227–31.
174
241 U.S. 565 (1916).
175
See id. at 566–67.
176
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
[choosing] Senators.”).
177
Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 566.
178
Id.
179
Id.
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appending a referendum to the process.180 The Court deferred to the state, finding that
appending the referendum was not contrary to Article I, Section 4 or Article 4, Section 4’s Republican Guarantee clause.181
By contrast, the Court struck down a state’s use of the referendum process in the
ratification of the eventual Eighteenth Amendment.182 In Hawke v. Smith,183 the Ohio
legislature had adopted a resolution ratifying the proposed amendment and “ordered
that certified copies of the joint resolution of ratification be forwarded by the
Governor to the Secretary of State at Washington and to the presiding officer of each
house of Congress.”184 But Ohio’s constitution provided that the state legislature’s
ratification of a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution be subject to a referendum by the people of Ohio.185 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the use of a referendum
to ratify a proposed constitutional amendment, held that Article V’s requirement that
constitutional amendments be ratified by the “legislatures” of three-fourths of the
states precluded Ohio’s use of a referendum in the ratification process.186 The Court
distinguished Hildebrant on the ground that while the Elections Clause187 “plainly
gives authority to the State to legislate” in the area of elections (and thus the ability
to establish a referendum procedure for approving congressional districts), Article
V neither authorizes nor requires the state to take “legislative action” when considering a constitutional amendment; it merely authorizes a state legislature to express
“assent or dissent to a proposed amendment to the Constitution.”188 Indeed, the
Court went so far as to describe the argument that the Constitution required ratification by the state’s then-current mode of legislation as “fallacious” and that “ratification . . . is not an act of legislation within the proper sense of the word.”189 Further,
the Court recognized that state legislatures derive their power from the people of the
state, who may prescribe the manner in which those legislatures act.190 The ratification power, however, emanates from the federal Constitution, which prescribes a
particular manner of exercising that power.191
180

See id. at 569.
Id. at 569–70. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion . . . .”).
182
See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229 (1920).
183
253 U.S. 221 (1919).
184
Id. at 225. Note that here, the legislature did not seek the Governor’s signature, but instead
instructed him to conduct a ministerial function.
185
Id.
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Id. at 225–26, 230–31.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . .”).
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Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230–31.
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Id. at 229.
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Id. at 230.
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The distinction between traditional modes of legislation and alternative pathways
to legislative actions (such as ratification) was further utilized in challenges before
the Court regarding the state executive’s role in redistricting and ratification.192
In Smiley v. Holm,193 the Minnesota legislature completed a new redistricting
scheme and transmitted it to the Governor, who then returned the scheme without
his approval.194 In response, rather than attempting to pass the scheme over the Governor’s alleged veto, the legislature submitted the same scheme to the Minnesota
Secretary of State.195 Defenders of the legislature’s choice argued that much like in
Hawke, Article I, Section 4 clearly granted the power to regulate elections solely to
the legislature, not the legislature and executive.196 The Court disagreed, however,
noting that “[t]he question here is not with respect to the ‘body’ as thus described
but as to the function to be performed. The use in the Federal Constitution of the
same term in different relations does not always imply the performance of the same
function.”197 The Court determined that because the legislature’s rules regarding
“times, places, and manner” would compose a comprehensive code and would need
to be enforced with punishments for transgressing the rules, the legislative act involved “lawmaking in its essential features and most important aspect.”198 Such a state
of affairs diverged from ratification in that in the “expression of assent or dissent . . . no
legislative action is authorized or required.”199
The Supreme Court recently addressed a variety of legislative actions in Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission.200 Although that
case centered on whether the people of Arizona, through a referendum rather than the
state legislature, could create a commission to draw new congressional districts, the
Court first summarized existing law regarding appropriate state decision-makers for
192

See, e.g., Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 374–75 (1932) (remanding a case where
Minnesota’s legislature tried to redistrict the State’s Congressional elections and bypass “at
large” voting).
193
285 U.S. 355 (1932).
194
Id. at 361.
195
Id.
196
Id. at 362–63.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 366.
199
Id. at 372. Similarly, when a state consents to the formation of a new state from the existing state’s current territory, no legislative action is authorized or required, as the existing state
has no further actions to take. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted
by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts
of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.” (emphasis added)). Cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 446–47 (1939) (involving a dispute whether executive participation in the constitutional ratification process was permissible,
not required).
200
135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
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redistricting purposes.201 The Court reaffirmed that redistricting involved the essential
components of lawmaking and, therefore, must be subject to the state’s legislative process.202 By contrast, “the Governor could play no part when the Constitution assigned
to ‘the Legislature’ a ratifying, electoral, or consenting function.”203 That is, Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission’s reasoning supports the proposition that the
legislature need not (and may not) include the executive when performing a consenting function, at least with respect to consenting functions assigned to the legislature
by the Constitution.204
In short, the Supreme Court’s state legislature jurisprudence supports the conclusion that when the Constitution assigns a legislature a consenting or ratification function, the executive has no role to play. In the case of the Compact Clause, this means
that Congress may consent to state compacts without seeking Presidential approval.
B. The Presentment Clauses
Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that the Constitution empowers legislatures
to consent without presentment, at least at the state level.205 There is no textual
reason to distinguish between state legislatures’ consent power (for example under
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1) and Congress’s consent power under the Compact
Clause.206 This Section will analyze the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Presentment Clause, which directly addresses presentment at the federal level.207
“The President’s participation in the legislative process was to protect the
Executive Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident
laws.”208 In traditional lawmaking, bills, however styled, must be presented to the
President and be signed or repassed over a presidential veto to take effect.209 The
Constitution enshrines the presentment requirement in Article I, Section 7, Clause 2.210
Further, under the ORV Clause, every order, resolution, or vote by both houses
similarly must be presented to the President for his approval.211
201

See id. at 2658, 2666–68.
Id. at 2668.
203
Id. at 2667.
204
An example is allowing a new state to be formed from the current territory of an existing
state. See id.
205
See id. There is no role for the Governor in “instances in which the Constitution calls
upon State Legislatures to exercise a function other than lawmaking.”
206
See id. at 2667.
207
See discussion infra Section II.B.
208
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
209
See id. at 951–52.
210
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President
of the United States . . . .”).
211
Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (“Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the
Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary [except on a question of Adjournment]
shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect,
202
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Madison stated that the ORV Clause “was introduced in order to ensure ‘that Congress could not circumvent the presentment requirement’ already placed in Article I,
Section 7, Clause 2 ‘by calling proposed legislation’ something ‘other than a bill.’”212
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story similarly noted the end-run
rationale for the ORV Clause.213 Relatedly, in Chadha, the Supreme Court recognized
that the ORV Clause was added to prevent Congress from circumventing presentment
and aggrandizing its own power.214 While some scholars have suggested that the
ORV Clause serves a further function, at a minimum, the clause serves to prevent
Congress from remaining unchecked.215
Yet Congress can act without executive approval in some situations.216 For example, Hollingsworth v. Virginia217 ruled that Article V’s grant of power to Congress
to propose constitutional amendments is not subject to presentment.218 Historians have
found that “[o]n the day of [Hollingsworth’s] oral argument, Justice Chase stated:
‘There can, surely, be no necessity to answer [Petitioners’] argument. The negative
of the president applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: he has nothing to do
with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the constitution.’”219 In a terse
opinion, the Hollingsworth Court recognized that the amendment had not been submitted to the President as seemingly required by the ORV Clause, since the Constitution
required the concurrence of both Houses to propose amendments.220 In addition, the
Court noted that simply because the required proportion of each House necessary to
propose an amendment was equal to the proportion necessary to override a veto did not
answer whether the ORV Clause applied.221 After all, the President may still veto a bill
that received “veto-proof” support, in hopes of persuading the legislature that the
bill is ill-conceived and should not be repassed.222 Nonetheless, the Court held that
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the
Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
Case of a Bill.”).
212
Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why
Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1311 (2005).
213
Id. at 1352.
214
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947–48 (1983).
215
See Tillman, supra note 212, at 1321–67 (discussing various interpretations of the ORV
Clause by legal scholars); see also Gary Lawson, Comment, Burning Down the House (and
Senate): A Presentment Requirement for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions,
and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1373, 1373–76 (2005) (analyzing Seth Tillman’s interpretation of the ORV Clause).
216
See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
217
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378.
218
See id. at 382.
219
Tillman, supra note 212, at 1275 (emphasis added) (citing Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
at 381, n.36).
220
Hollingsworth, 3 U.S. at 379.
221
Id.
222
See id.
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Congress had acted consistently with the Constitution and that the Eleventh Amendment had not been birthed stillborn.223 Thus, as early as 1798, the Supreme Court
found at least one example of a bicameral congressional action that operated outside
the confines of presentment.224
The Hollingsworth Court’s decision implicitly draws upon the Framer’s understanding of the President’s relationship to Congress and the nature of the President’s
participation in the traditional legislative power. Sections II.C and II.D shall examine
the development of the English conception of executive power225 and how such ideas
refracted through the Revolutionary Period.226 The distinctly American conception
of the Executive helps explain the Hollingsworth Court’s decision and justifies the extension of that precedent to Congress’s consent powers under Article I, Section 10,
Clauses 2 and 3. It further bolsters the argument that the Constitution supports the
reinvigoration of the legislature and the states.
In addition to Hollingsworth’s recognition that the ORV Clause is not as allencompassing as one might assume, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there
are some alternative pathways for passing binding rules.227 While traditional legislation must be passed through bicameralism and presentment, Chadha recognized that
the Treaty Power (wherein only the Senate can act) reflected one such alternative
pathway.228 Indeed, the Constitution distinguishes between the treaty-making
process and the law-making process,229 and the Supreme Court, in furtherance of the
distinction, has drawn still another distinction between self-executing treaties, which
take effect upon ratification, and non-self-executing treaties, which must be codified
through traditional legislation before taking effect.230
223

Id. at 382.
See id.
225
See discussion infra Section II.C.
226
See discussion infra Section II.D.
227
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
228
See id.
229
The Constitution’s distinction between legislation and treaties mirrors the medieval
English distinction between “jurisdictio and gubernaculum: the authority of a judge or custodian
of the law, and the authority of a guide, a ‘helmsman’ or a ‘pilot’,” and the attendant requirement
for the King to act with Parliament in exercising his domestic jurisdictio powers. MICHAEL
OAKESHOTT, LECTURES IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 320 (2006).
230
See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (“This Court has long recognized
the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that—
while they constitute international law commitments—do not by themselves function as binding
federal law. The distinction was well explained in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster
v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), which held that a treaty is ‘equivalent to an act of the
legislature,’ and hence self-executing, when it ‘operates of itself without the aid of any legislative
provision.’ When, in contrast, ‘[treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they can only be
enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect.’ In sum, while treaties ‘may compromise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either
enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executing”
and is ratified on these terms.’” (citations omitted)).
224
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If we accept that the legislative power may occasionally be utilized without bicameralism, as is textually allowed under the Treaty Power, where the Senate exercises
its unilateral consenting powers,231 then perhaps, based on the structure of the Constitution and the nature of the power utilized, there are other legislative powers latent
in the Constitution that may be utilized without presentment. In Sections II.F, II.G,
and II.H, we shall examine three such potential provisions—Article V’s “Constitutive
Power,”232 Article I, Section 10, Clause 2’s Import-Export Power,233 and Article I,
Section 10, Clause 3’s Compact Power.234
C. English Executive Precedent and Its Meta-Theory
As Edward Campbell Mason recognized in his magisterial work, The Veto Power:
Since the time of the Teutonic tribes a change has gradually been
taking place, and now in the United States two authorities are
interested in the making of laws: Congress, which, like its early
prototype, can either accept or reject proposed legislation; and
the President, who is entirely separate from Congress, but has a
qualified power of rejection which is similar to the negative
power of Congress.235
Originally, upon the conquest of England, the Teutonic tribes maintained their
pre-existing governmental traditions—the ‘people’ were sovereign, but slowly the King
began to acquire greater authority.236 The King’s growing power can most clearly
be seen in his national council, the Witenagemot.237 Eventually, as Mason noted, “the
legislative power which had been exercised formerly by the whole people came to be
exercised by a comparatively small number of men [the Witenagemot] who were summoned and practically controlled by the King.”238 The English King’s legislative
power, particularly after the Norman Conquest, can be broken into three primary
categories, excluding the veto: “the power of creating substantive law by royal proclamation, the power of suspension, and the power of dispensation.”239
231

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur . . . .”).
232
See discussion infra Section II.F.
233
See discussion infra Section II.G.
234
See discussion infra Section II.H.
235
EDWARD CAMPBELL MASON, THE VETO POWER: ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND
FUNCTION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (Albert Bushnell Hart ed., 1890).
236
Id. at 12.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
See id. at 12–13.
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Inevitably though, Parliament and the King clashed over their concurrent legislative
powers.240 In 1610, James I’s use of the proclamation power spurred a feud with Parliament, resulting in a judicial decision against the use of proclamations.241 Although
the beheading of Charles I stymied his use of proclamations, the Commons did not
prohibit proclamations as a constitutional matter until 1766.242 The Glorious Revolution marked the end of the suspension and dispensing powers.243 All that remained of
the King’s ‘legislative’ power was his ability to veto legislation.244 Not long afterwards, even the Executive’s approval became naught more than a formalistic ritual; as
an English constitutional commentator provocatively put it, “the Queen ‘must sign
her own death-warrant if the two Houses send it to her.’”245 Mason noted that:
Bills have been defeated by the announcement that the Sovereign
would consider its promoters unfriendly; they have been defeated
by royal influence or royal bribes, but never since 1708 has the
signature of the Sovereign been refused to a measure which has
obtained a majority of both Houses of Parliament.246
The King’s participation in legislation historically had significance for the legitimacy of law that is lost on modern minds. By searching for antecedents to the
Constitution’s separation of powers, a historian of ideas would miss the essential
concepts of Mixed Constitutionalism and the Ruler-Ruled distinction. As Professor
Gordon Wood recognized, the conflict between the King’s “prerogatives” and the
people’s liberties animated the eighteenth-century’s political conflicts.247 Contrary
to the modern liberal conception of politics, these historical actors viewed politics
on a spectrum from absolute power, in one person’s hands, to absolute liberty of the
people; both states portended disaster.248 Different still, participants understood
politics through the prism of the “three estates of the realm” rather than a contest for
control between various interest groups.249
Prevailing wisdom held that the three forms of rule—monarchy, aristocracy, and
democracy—were all unstable forms of governance; the best constitution sought to
blend the three forms to synthesize a stable regime.250 As such, legislation needed
240

Id. at 13.
Id.
242
See id.
243
Id. at 14 (“[T]he powers were taken away from the Crown in the first year after the Revolution of 1688.”).
244
Id. at 15.
245
Id. at 16–17.
246
Id. at 17.
247
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787 19 (1969).
248
See id.
249
Id. at 20.
250
Id. at 198.
241
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to involve the many, through the House of Commons; the few, through the House of
Lords; and the one, through the King.251 In that sense, the King truly participated in legislation, as to exclude the King would be to ignore the dictates of Mixed Constitutionalism.252 This was the King in Parliament in the parlance of the day.253 The potential for
the King’s veto charged all of the Parliament’s legislation with a magisterial element.254
Yet, this was decidedly not the character of American executive power.255
D. America’s Conceptual Revolution
The Framers built a republican form of government with a strong suspicion towards
the Executive, demonstrating that no executive power or participation should be assumed.256 The transition to a republican form of government sparked the Framers to
radically reconceive the functions of the separate branches of government.257 Rather
than creating a Roman Senate or House of Lords premised on aristocracy, the Revolutionary-era politicians justified the American Senate through its ability to better
represent the will of the people and to protect individual liberty.258 Similarly, the
American executive was stripped of the regal trappings of the English executive.259
The colonists were very concerned about tyranny and valued the importance of
leaving the power to govern with the people.260 Our radical Whig ancestors believed
leaving power in the hands of the people was essential to maintaining a peaceful
society.261 Though they originally thought the King and Parliament represented the
people, eighteenth-century practice undermined this theory.262 The people increased
participation in the House of Commons, which tended to blur the distinction between
the rulers and the ruled, which lay at the heart of the Whig theory of politics.263 It
would be this blurring of the distinction that would force the Founders to develop
an intellectual edifice to appraise and remedy the divisions in the emerging political
251

See id.
See id.
253
See OAKESHOTT, supra note 229, at 320–21.
254
See WOOD, supra note 247, at 587.
255
See discussion infra Section II.D.
256
See infra notes 253–98 and accompanying text.
257
See WOOD, supra note 247, at 553–62 (discussing the various proposals for designing
the Separation of Powers).
258
See id.
259
See id.
260
See id. at 46–124, 257–343. As Burke rightly said of the colonists, “They augur misgovernment at a distance and snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze.” Id. at 5.
261
See id. at 23–24. Following the words of Algernon Sidney, the would-be revolutionaries
believed that “[p]eace is seldom made, and never kept . . . unless the subject retain such a power
in his hands as may oblige the prince to stand to what is agreed.” Id. at 24 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
262
See id. at 25–26.
263
Id. at 26.
252
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environment. Soon the Founders would discover the potential for a tyranny by the
people, a theoretical impossibility in Whig ideology.264
Convinced that oppression inevitably emanated from the executive, the revolutionaries turned their gimlet eyes toward the “kingly” branch.265 The Colonists rent
asunder the executive department in their new state constitutions, convinced that
such actions would forever rid America of tyranny.266 In large part, Americans believed
that, as a moral people, they could restrain their passions internally and serve as a beacon for men who aspire toward freedom.267 America was to be a republic—a republic sustained by the innate virtue of the American people.268
These were decidedly not the type of men who would suggest that “[a]mbition
must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected
with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government.”269
Madison’s 1787 proposals were a reaction to, not a fulfillment of, the aspirations
and beliefs of 1776.270 Accordingly, the Framers’ expansion of the executive branch
must be understood against the backdrop of anti-executive sentiment. Therefore, the
colonists’ attitude of extreme suspicion towards the executive shows that executive
participation should not be assumed in the American constitutional structure.
In determining the role of presentment in our constitutional system, the issue can
be posed in one of two ways: (1) what sort of bills or congressional resolutions must
be sent to the President? or (2) what sort of issues must the President be able to veto
based on our constitutional structure? By asking the latter question, we can examine the
purposes of the veto and, correlatively, the scope of the Presentment and ORV Clauses.
The Framers believed that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny.”271 Once rendered diminutive and impotent, the Framers now saw virtue in
a strong executive, capable of checking the “impetuous vortex” that is the legislative
branch.272 Indeed, Madison went so far as to claim that “it is against the enterprising
ambition of this department [the legislature] that the people ought to indulge all their
jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.”273
264

Id. at 62.
See id. at 135–36.
266
See id. at 136 (“The Americans . . . made . . . the [Executive] . . . a pale reflection . . . of
his regal ancestor.”).
267
See id. at 91–107.
268
Id. at 101.
269
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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See WOOD, supra note 247, at 472.
271
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308–09 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
273
Id. at 309.
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Inspired by this fear, the Framers structured our Constitution such that ambition
and self-interest would prevent Congress from overreaching, as the state legislatures
had. Yet, how best could the branches be structured in relation to each other to prevent
the legislature from usurping executive power? The solution was twofold: bicameralism
and the veto.274 Madison noted, “[a]s the weight of the legislative authority requires
that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other
hand, that it should be fortified.”275 Indeed, as Hamilton noted, “[t]he primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the executive is to enable him to
defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.”276
Hamilton recognized that while the essence of the legislative branch lies in the
enactment of laws, the essence of the executive branch lies in the execution of laws
and the command of the military forces.277 To prevent Congress’s usurpation of the
executive function, the Framers believed they must endow the President with either
an absolute or qualified negative upon the acts of the legislative branch.278 Without
the one or the other, Congress would likely aggrandize itself and strip the Executive
of all of his powers.279
What then may we conclude about the nature of the President’s participation in
lawmaking? Unlike the English kings, the President’s veto did not represent a distinct
estate—in a republican form of government, there is only the people.280 Madison
recognized that under the Constitution, all laws or resolutions required the concurrence of the people—through the House, and the states—through the Senate.281 With
those two entities already represented in the federal government, there was no need
for the President’s imprimatur for democratic legitimacy. As Professor Gordon Wood
has recognized, “[t]he limited negative did not grant, as critics were charging, legislative power to the executive, thus violating the doctrine of separation of powers.”282
The veto has no greater social significance, then, but is “only a check on the
legislature—a device to maintain the proper separation of powers. Such a description
of the executive veto was a perversion of the ancestral English Crown’s role in legislation, and of the traditional theory of mixed government.”283 The Framers empowered
the President to veto legislation to prevent Congress from harvesting the President’s
power for itself and instituting a tyranny.284 Empowering the President would prove
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 269, at 322–23.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 276, at 441–42.
See id. at 441.
See WOOD, supra note 247, at 607.
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less dangerous, our Framers thought, because the President could not write laws, only
enforce them, and would be checked by independent judges and juries.285 The Framers
enabled the President in recognition that the Constitution would empower Congress
to dictate national policy.286
The Framers’s limited executive simply had no vested interest in any specific
legislation and was given his veto to protect his institutional prerogative. At most,
some have argued that the President may refuse to enforce laws he deems unconstitutional.287 Although the President may “recommend to [Congress’s] Consideration
such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient[,]”288 the Constitution in
no way requires Congress to act upon, let alone seriously consider, the proposal.
Contrast that with Article V, where “[t]he Congress . . . on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments.”289 While Congress must comply with state actions toward amending
our fundamental charter,290 the Congress, if it so desires, may summarily dismiss any
proposition by the President. Congress’s decision to grant consideration to the Executive’s desires is merely gratuitous and based on respect for his judgment. In contrast
to the magisterial prerogative of proclamation, where the King could fashion the weapons he sought to wield,291 the President at most can assert a narrow field of what we
may term his Executory Interest.292 In defining the Executory Interest, the substance of
the law is irrelevant, but the relationship of the law to the President’s duty to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed”293 is of supreme importance. The American people
understood Congress to be our legislative body, fully empowered to legislate to further
the tranquility of the land utilizing its delegated powers, as this Article argues.
Indeed, even the Commander-in-Chief Clause merely provides that “[t]he President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;”294
the President will only have an army if Congress exercises its powers under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 12,295 and the President can only lead the militia if Congress calls
forth the militia under Article I, Section 8, Clause 15.296 Based on the textual grants
285

See AMAR, supra note 42, at 63.
See id. at 64–67.
287
See id. at 179.
288
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
289
Id. art. V (emphasis added).
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Id.
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See MASON, supra note 235, at 12.
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U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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Id.
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Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;”).
296
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (“To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions . . . .”).
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to the President and Congress, the Court has set forth a jurisprudence that at its core
aims to protect the President’s Executory Interest (faithful execution of the law)297
without allowing the President to usurp legislative power.298
E. Modern Separation of Powers Precedent
Modern separation of powers jurisprudence focuses on concerns about “encroachment” and “aggrandizement.”299 This approach rightfully focuses the inquiry on
whether one branch has either usurped the powers of another branch or interfered with
the due functioning of its coordinate branch.300 Within this sphere, we find (i) cases that
deal with questions of whether the President has usurped legislative power by the use
of his discretion,301 further refined by Justice Jackson’s three categories from his
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer concurrence;302 (ii) cases that address
whether Congress has established either a process,303 institution,304 officer,305 or
law306 that unduly infringes upon the President’s Executory Interest; or (iii) cases that
consider whether Congress has usurped the Court’s inherent judicial powers.307 Moreover, other procedural and jurisdictional matters, such as standing, may in large part be
seen as part of our separation of powers jurisprudence as well.308 When the Court confronts a separation-of-powers challenge alleging congressional encroachment upon the
executive’s prerogative or aggrandizement at the executive’s expense, the Court’s
297

See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954–56 (1983); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714, 722–23 (1986) (“The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in
the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts. The President appoints ‘Officers of the United States’ with the ‘Advice and Consent of the Senate . . . .’ Once
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inquiry “focuses on the extent to which [the Act] prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”309
The Chadha Court directly confronted Congress’s attempt to usurp executive
power through a congressional veto.310 In reaction to “the clumsy, time-consuming
private bill procedure” previously used to suspend deportation, Congress delegated
the authority to the Attorney General, but sought to retain a veto outside of the constitutionally prescribed manner of enacting federal legislation—bicameralism and
presentment.311 Absent the statutory reservation of power, Congress could not reverse
the Attorney General’s decision.312 It was Congress’s institutional innovation that
allowed it to effectively control executive discretion outside of the constitutionally
prescribed checks on the Executive; indeed, the purpose of the congressional veto
was to encroach upon the President’s Executory Interest.313 The Executive had no
vested interest in being granted the statutory discretion, but the Court found that
Congress could not grant the authority with conditions that accreted power to Congress through the encroachment upon the President’s Executory Interest.314 If the
Court allowed Congress to maintain the power over the executive’s discretion, then
Congress would be arrogating legislative and executive power for itself, which “may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”315
Congress similarly sought to infringe upon the President’s Executory Interest by
attempting to maintain control over the Comptroller General in the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, popularly known as the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act.316 Under the law, only Congress could remove the Comptroller General,
an executive officer, through a joint resolution or impeachment.317 As such, the Court
believed that threats from Congress might influence the Comptroller General to execute laws in accordance with Congress’s—and not the President’s—desires.318 As the
Court declared, “[t]he Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress
in the supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts.”319 The
Court derived its observation from the “Decision of 1789,” the debate in the First Congress where “James Madison urged rejection of a congressional role in the removal
of Executive Branch officers, other than by impeachment . . . .”320 Congressional
309
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legislation restricting the President’s ability to discipline his inferiors to guarantee
that he takes care to faithfully execute the laws unduly encroaches upon the President’s Executory Interest.321 There have been a few notable exceptions to this general
rule, but at most those cases stand for the proposition that Congress must not encroach upon the Executory Interest in a way that aggrandizes its own power.322
The Court has prevented Congress from circumventing separation of powers
concerns by cooperating with the states through a Constitutional Compact.323 In
Metro Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise,324 Congress had granted its approval to a Constitutional Compact to deal with
an infrastructure investment issue.325 Congress had enacted the compact to guarantee
financing through tax-exempt bonds to guarantee the continued “excellent management” of the local airports.326 Congress, to assuage certain Representatives’ fears
about ceding federal control, placed a provision in the consent that required that the
Compact be supervised by a board of review, composed of nine congressmen, that
could veto the compact commission’s actions, including the promulgation of
regulations and adoption of a budget.327 The Court concluded that:
We thus confront an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the
powers of which Congress has delineated, the purpose of which is
321
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to protect an acknowledged federal interest, and membership in
which is restricted to congressional officials. Such an entity necessarily exercises sufficient federal power as an agent of Congress
to mandate separation-of-powers scrutiny.328
The ability of Congress to effectively control the execution of the Constitutional Compact, through the threat of vetoing the Compact Commission’s budget and regulations,
arrogated executive powers to Congress, a violation of the separation of powers.329
To the extent that the federal government maintains executive power, that executive
power must be exercised by the Executive.330 Left unanswered, of course, is the
question whether without presentment Congress could have validly enacted the Constitutional Compact without the control provision. Yet, it seems suspect that such an
arrangement would run afoul of the Constitution. In such a scenario, Congress would
not be reserving executive power for itself, and would not be impinging upon the
Executory Interest of the President; it simply would not have created a scheme that
requires Presidential execution.
We shall further inquire into this issue after first examining how the concept of
an Executory Interest helps to illuminate Hollingsworth v. Virginia.331
F. Article V and Presentment: The Constitutive Power
In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the Court confronted a challenge to the validity of
the Eleventh Amendment.332 Prior to the Eleventh Amendment, the Court had ruled
that citizens from different states could bring suit against a State government in federal court.333 In response to the Court’s decision, both Houses of Congress voted to
send to the States what would become the Eleventh Amendment.334
In Hollingsworth, the Court recognized that if the amendment were validly enacted
and properly enforceable, the Court would lack jurisdiction to hear Hollingsworth’s
suit against the State of Virginia.335 Hollingsworth “challenged the procedure by which
the Amendment had been adopted,” arguing that its lack of a presidential signature—
i.e., the lack of presentment—made it invalid under the ORV Clause.336 This assertion
was particularly consequential, as Congress had not presented the Bill of Rights to
the President either.337
328
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330
331
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333
334
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Hollingsworth was decided by pronouncement. At oral argument, Justice Chase
summarily declared that “[t]here can, [s]urely, be no nece[ss]ity to an[s]wer that
argument,” namely the lack of presentment.338 “The negative of the president applies
only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing to do with the proposition
or adoption of amendments to the constitution.”339 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have relied on this statement to require that the amendment process strictly
follow the text of Article V.340
As commentators pithily have observed, “[t]he [Hollingsworth] Court solved the
[presentment] problem by declaring it solved.”341 The rationale underlying Justice
Chase’s statement in Hollingsworth may be illuminated by reference to his earlier
statement at the Maryland ratifying convention that, “[t]he people’s power . . . ‘is
like the light of the sun, native, original, inherent, and unlimited by human authority.
Power in the rulers or governors of the people is like the reflected light of the moon,
and is only borrowed, delegated and limited by the grant of the people.’”342
Properly understood, this means that Congress does not possess the Constitutive
Power but rather serves to check the states in allowing the people to act.343 Congress’s
ability to submit proposed amendments to state legislatures or Conventions should be
seen as analogous to the President’s ability to “recommend to [Congress’s] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”344 Congress can
determine to which body its proposed amendment will go—a state legislature or a
state convention; but, whereas Congress controls the decision-maker regarding constitutional amendments (a state legislature or a state convention), the decision to amend
the Constitution lies with the people, who possess the Constitutive Power.345
To understand fully Congress’s relationship to the Constitutive Power, we must
first inquire into the American conception of constitutions.346
1. The Higher Law: The American Conception of Popular Sovereignty
As with nearly any important concept from the American founding, we must trace
the antecedents in English law and examine how Americans came to reconceive the
concepts through resistance to the British Empire, the fighting of the Revolution,
and the reflection upon the instabilities in post-Revolutionary America.
338
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A striking feature of the discontented colonists in the 1760s is their insistence
that the “letter and spirit of the British constitution” justified their actions.347 The
colonists’ reliance upon the British Constitution as a bulwark against their imperial
oppressors struck an antiquated cord.348 As Professor Gordon Wood has noted, “by
the last quarter of the eighteenth century it seemed clearer than ever before to most
Englishmen that all such moral and natural law limitations on the Parliament were
strictly theoretical, without legal meaning, and relevant only in so far as they impinged
on the minds of the lawmakers.”349 Rejection of a higher law imposed upon Parliament coincided with the intellectual shift to the idea of Parliamentary Supremacy.350
Expositors on the British Constitution in the eighteenth century, such as
Blackstone, drew no distinction between the British Constitution and the laws Parliament enacted.351 With the collapse of the King’s veto discussed earlier,352 it was
Parliament, not as a court, but as a legislative body, that could create whatever legal
regime it desired.353 Colonial lawyers, like James Otis, nominally accepted Parliamentary Supremacy while still suggesting that the British Constitution restrained the
Parliament, based on a medieval presumption that what was not just was not law.354
Otis believed that all laws against “natural equity” should be declared void.355 Yet,
many American revolutionaries came to see that the validity of laws lay not in their
correspondence with natural equity, but that they had been promulgated by the
Sovereign.356 Thus, our Founders came to believe that to protect the people’s rights embedded in the common law from despots and usurpers that “somehow these principles
and rights must be protected and guaranteed by lifting them out of government.”357
Past written declarations of the English people’s rights, such as the Magna Carta
and the English Bill of Rights of 1689, may have been “undoubtedly of a nature more
sacred than those which established a turnpike . . .[,]” but nonetheless could be repealed
by a subsequent act of Parliament.358 Yet, the rebelling colonists saw the combination
of written documents with the distinction between fundamental and statutory law
permeating the American consciousness as a means to restrain the government.359
Indeed, Americans had regularly cited their charters to repel imperial intrusions.360
347
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As Wood saw, “[t]he problem for Americans in the 1780’s then was to refine and
to make effective the distinction between fundamental and statutory law that all in
1776 had at least paid lip service to, and this essentially involved making clear the
precise nature of a constitution.”361 In clarifying the distinction, the American people
came to believe that “[o]nly the people by either ‘persons legally authorized by them
or themselves’ could create or alter a constitution.”362
In English history, the charters of the people’s liberties memorialized agreements
between the “King of England, and our predecessors,” recognizing—not creating—the
people’s liberties.363 This may have been fitting for a nation that still conceived of itself
in terms of three distinct estates, but for a republican government, there was no entity above the people with whom the people had to contract. In response, Americans exalted a new contractual analogy—the Lockean social contract.364 Precisely because
a constitution was a contract between the people, only the people could alter the
contract.365 Further, to allow a legislature to amend the constitution (the people’s
fundamental charter) would be to reintroduce the ruler-ruled distinction by allowing
those in government to dictate to the people the nature of the social contract; such
an arrangement could not be countenanced by a republican people.366 Yet, to make
the constitution unamendable by the legislature, the legislature could not be allowed
to draw up the contract in the first place.367 The Founders, drawing on British history
and recent experiences, would find that the proper place for this Constitutive Power was
in conventions.368
The concept of a convention has a rather complicated past in English history and
the colonial resistance.369 As Wood has recognized:
Convention was an ancient term in English history, dating back at
least to early medieval times. Literally a convention was a meeting,
an act of coming together, used to refer to all sorts of assemblies,
especially formal assemblies, convened for deliberation on important matters, whether ecclesiastical, political, or social. Meetings
of the clergy or of the barons, or of both, together with spokesmen
for the people, outside of the established Crown institutions,
were commonly called conventions. It was just such an assembly
of the barons, prelates, and people—a convention of the estates of
361
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the realm—that accepted Edward II’s abdication in 1327, and a
similar convention of estates participated in a more ambiguous
manner in the accession of Henry IV in 1399. Throughout the
medieval period such conventions of the estates of the realm were
regarded as quite distinct from the Parliament and in fact were
thought to embody the nation more completely than Parliament
did, since Parliament was more the King’s instrument for receiving
taxes and petitions and for governing the realm than it was a full
representation or spokesman of the society.370
While conventions featured prominently in this early period of the English state, by
the fifteenth century, the English people began to identify the meeting of the three
estates with Parliament, making Parliament representative of the whole country.371
The concept of a convention lay dormant for over two centuries only to be revisited in the turbulent seventeenth century.372 During this period:
[W]hen the Commons and Lords were forced to convene without
the King, Englishmen struggled with the proper terms to describe
the meetings, with convention being commonly used by those who
considered the bodies legally irregular. When Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660 by such a body, men were hard
pressed to answer “whether anything done by this convention
can be obliging to the nation, seeing they have not the right constitution of a parliament, according to the fundamental laws of the
Kingdom?” In 1688 the body of Lords and Commons likewise
called itself a convention until it had conferred the Crown on
William and Mary at which time it became a Parliament.373
Thus, two of the most significant acts in England’s seventeenth century, the restoration
of the throne and the Glorious Revolution, were carried out by a body distinguished
by the absence of the executive department.374
Americans similarly became acquainted with conventions throughout the eighteenth century, using the term to denote similarly momentous plans, such as the
proposed continental union of 1754.375 In response to the vagaries of administration
during the colonial period, where the governor or council would become absent,
370
371
372
373
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colonial legislatures had to develop theoretical justifications to continue to operate.376 Indeed, by 1773, the provincial bodies at all levels of government established themselves as permanent bodies, removing the governor’s ability to prorogue
the assemblies.377 When governors attempted to prorogue the bodies, the bodies
would continue on, claiming the status of conventions.378 In response to the attack
on the legitimacy of the conventions, prominent colonists and future framers such
as James Wilson379 responded “‘that the objections of our adversaries cannot be
urged against us’ without denying the legality of the proceedings of the Revolution
of 1688.”380 By the 1780s, the people believed that conventions, rather than being
deficient, were superior to normal legislatures because of the people’s approval.381
Yet what was the constitutional status of these conventions, and how did they relate
to the concept of sovereignty?
Americans explained conventions outside of the traditional governmental process
by moving the very concept of sovereignty outside of the duly constituted governments.382 In England, first, the meeting of the estates in Parliament, and then Parliament in its own right, were sovereign.383 As we discussed in Sections II.B and II.C,
Americans had rejected this “estates-view” of society in favor of a uniform, republican vision.384 Accordingly, sovereignty remained indivisibly vested in the people
rather than with unified estates.385
Indeed, the people no longer were “in government” as the people of England
were through their representation in the Commons. The people remained outside the
government, appraising their agents’ actions with a gimlet eye.386 Although inchoate
at the time, it was upon this conceptual distinction that the people of North Carolina
could inform their delegates to the North Carolina Convention of 1776 that “[p]olitical power . . . is of two kinds, one principal and superior, the other derived and
inferior. . . . The principal supreme power is possessed by the people at large, the
derived and inferior power by the servants which they employ.”387 Upon this basis,
the American people could justify their durable restrictions placed on the government itself—the people always retained the Constitutive Power.388
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2. The American Experience with the Constitutive Power
In discussing sovereignty and the Constitutive Power in the American context,
we must directly confront a set of linguistic and technical issues.389 On the one hand,
distinguished scholars maintain that during the Articles of Confederation, the states
were independent sovereigns.390 Yet at the same time, states like Massachusetts and
New Hampshire struggled through the exercise of the Constitutive Power and the people’s assertion of their sovereignty.391 Thus, we must recognize the states as sovereigns
while at the same time recognizing that each state was a mere instrumentality for the
sovereign people. This linguistic confusion was further exacerbated once the Constitution was ratified and the federal government came into being and has persisted to the
present day. Consider, for instance, Justice Souter’s declaration in his Alden v. Maine392
dissent that “[t]he National Constitution formally and finally repudiated the received
political wisdom that a system of multiple sovereignties constituted the ‘great solecism
of an imperium in imperio.’”393 This statement is erroneous—sovereignty remained
undivided in the people.394 As James Wilson declared at the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention, “sovereignty resided not in any set of governmental institutions but in
the people, who ‘only dispensed such portions of power as were conceived necessary
for the public welfare.’”395 Pursuant to this authority, the people delegated different
powers to the state and federal government.396 Yet, the states qua states still played an
essential role.397 As Professor Pauline Maier has noted:
The people formed [our federal republic]—not the people as a
single body but “the people as composing thirteen sovereignties”
since the people of each state chose representatives who met in
convention to decide on ratification and no state was bound until
its people gave their consent. Even so, the Constitution was dramatically different from the Articles of Confederation, whose authority came from the state legislatures. The Constitution rested
on “the superior power of the people.” Members of the House of
Representatives would be chosen by the people, senators by the
state legislatures.398
389
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Properly speaking, neither the states nor the federal government possess the
Constitutive Power but are rather part of a process of channeling the people’s sovereign power in an orderly manner; without an orderly process for the people to express
their will, the states had experienced violent outbursts of “the people out-of-doors,”
as Gordon Wood has termed it.399 What is clear, however, is that unlike Congress’s
legislative power or the President’s executive power,400 both of which are derived
from the people’s Constitutive Power, no one may assert that an established entity
possesses the Constitutive Power without contradicting the fundamental postulates
of the American Republic. No entity other than the people possesses the Constitutive
Power, thus our sovereignty.
Nonetheless, Americans commonly refer to state and federal governments as
sovereign units, defined jurisdictionally and geographically. This notion of governments as sovereign derives from the authority of the people in their sovereign capacity
to delegate powers to the federal and state governments.401
Conceiving of the state and federal governments as “sovereign entities,” though
ultimately not sovereign, helps to explain the form of Article V. In addressing the
Constitutive Power early in the convention, George Mason supported a resolution
declaring that:
The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the
Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them,
in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust chance
and violence. It would be improper to require the consent of the
[National] Legislature because they may abuse their power, and
refuse their consent on that very account. The opportunity for
such an abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for
amendm[en]t.402
The original committee draft of Article V only allowed the states to propose amendments.403 Note, then, that originally the Framers assigned to Congress a ministerial
role in Article V.404 Completely without discretion, the Convention’s exclusion of
the executive seems sensible.
Alexander Hamilton objected to the proposed form of Article V, believing that
states would only seek to aggrandize themselves, while Congress would be in a
399
400
401
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position to readily ascertain necessary amendments—“[t]here could be no danger
in giving this power, as the people would finally decide in the case.”405
Eventually, the Convention would largely adopt Hamilton’s proposal.406 Only
by the consent of the sovereign entity (the state), however, could a state be denied
its equal suffrage in the Senate, showing the elevated status of states in the Constitution.407 States may demand a Constitutional Convention to restrict federal power, but
Congress may designate a convention, not a state legislature, as the proper forum for
ratification, if Congress believes the states will act contrary to the will of the people.408
In this way, state governments cannot manipulate the people’s Constitutive Power
in making amendments to the constitution.
Further, the federal legislature can propose amendments and have them ratified
in state conventions, preventing the state governments from stymieing the people
from amending the constitution for the general welfare.409 Similarly, the federal legislature cannot stymie states from restraining the federal government; if a sufficient
number of states apply to Congress for a convention, Congress must act.410 Textually
and structurally, Congress can check the states and the states can check Congress.411
This process empowers both Congress and the States, and it may facilitate cooperation.
Motivated both by a commitment to the voters who placed him in Congress and
a desire to prevent a second constitutional convention, Madison began his determined effort to amend the Constitution.412 “Washington made only one substantive
recommendation to the First Congress”—amend the Constitution to preserve its
strengths and address its opponents’ fears.413
Ultimately Congress formally proposed twelve amendments.414 Notably, the proposed amendments were not presented to the President for his approval before they
were sent to the states, indicating that the constitutional presentment mandate was
not as all-encompassing as the language of the ORV Clause itself might suggest.415
Thus, we may return to Justice Chase’s statement in the oral arguments of Hollingsworth that “[t]here can, surely, be no necessity to answer [Petitioners’] argument.
The negative of the president applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: he has
nothing to do with the proposition or adoption of amendments to the constitution.”416
405
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The Framers endowed the President with the veto for two reasons: to defend his
executory interest and to prevent hasty legislation.417 The President does not have
a vested interest in any particular piece of legislation, only in his Executory Interest.418 In the case of a proposed amendment, there simply is nothing for the President
to execute.
Further, Article V provides a sufficient check to the relevant parties to obviate
the need for presidential participation.419 The Constitution obligates Congress to call
a convention if a sufficient number of states petition.420 Thus, the federal government cannot prevent the states from restraining federal overreach. On the other hand,
to prevent state governments from undermining the federal government, Congress
can choose state conventions rather than state legislatures for ratification.421 Similarly, if the federal government seeks additional powers to better promote the
welfare of the people, but at the expense of state governments, Congress can send
such a proposal to state conventions rather than to the interested state governments.422
Thus, the constitutional amendment process is safeguarded by two entities that check
each other apart from Congress—the States and conventions.
Where the President has no executory interest and where there are sufficient
checks built into the constitutional process, there is simply no reason to infer presidential participation. Later in his career, Madison demonstrated his constitutional
scruples in vetoing an internal improvements bill he had recommended because he
believed it exceeded federal power.423 Accordingly, it seems likely that Madison’s
decision not to submit the proposed constitutional amendments to Washington was
driven by a principled belief that the President had no role in the constitutive power—
i.e., no role in proposing amendments to the Constitution. In sum, those provisions
in the Constitution that: (i) solely require congressional action or congressional consent, and that (ii) neither involve the Executory Interest, (iii) nor lack a check upon
Congress, should not be construed to involve the President.
G. Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 and Presentment: The Interstitial ImportExport Power
Having established one exception to the ORV Clause, involving the Constitutive
Power in amending the Constitution,424 we will now turn to two further exceptions
to presentment, both of which explicitly empower Congress and the States to cooperate
and innovate without presidential involvement.425
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425

THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 276, at 443.
See discussion supra Sections II.C, D.
See U.S. CONST. art. V.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See MASON, supra note 235, at 94–95.
See discussion supra Section II.F.2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2–3.
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Both Article I, Section 10, Clause 2’s Interstitial Import-Export Power and Article I, Section 10, Clause 3’s Interstitial Regulatory Power can be used to revitalize our
federal system. In each case, states are prohibited from either “lay[ing] any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
[its] inspection Laws[,]”426 or “enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a Foreign power”427 without congressional consent. We shall observe two
reasons these clauses fall outside the ambit of the ORV Clause. First, based on the
meaning of the text, the history of the provisions, and the separation-of-powers principles established earlier, neither clause establishes a federal Executory Interest, obviating
the need for presidential participation. Further, the two Article I, Section 10 powers
implicate powers that provisions in Article I, Section 9 prohibit Congress from
utilizing in the traditional lawmaking process.428 Precisely because Congress cannot
pass these provisions on its own initiative, but only in coordination with state governments, relying on the states to execute the provisions,429 we should not assume
presidential participation.
1. Text, Context, and Separation of Powers
Article I, Section 10, Clause 2 prohibits states from laying duties on imports or
exports without Congress’s consent.430 Much like Article V, the text implies that states
solely need Congress’s consent, not traditional legal approval involving a presidential signature.431 We think that the Import-Export Clause should be treated in the
same way that Hollingsworth treated the Article V amendment provision—i.e., without the need for presentment. It provides another example where the ORV Clause
has narrower application than one might think.
The federal and state governments are not entirely distinct entities. The Constitution
provides for an extensive amount of state participation in the federal government.432
Madison recognized that “[t]he State governments may be regarded as constituent
426

Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
428
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2–3, with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
429
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
430
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
431
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. art. V.
432
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any
State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”); id.
art. I, § 3, cl. 1. (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.”);
id. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (“[A]nd if Vacancies [in the Senate] happen by Resignation, or otherwise,
during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary
Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.”).
See also the provisions in Article I, Section 10 which Congress cannot act upon unilaterally. Id.
art. I, § 10.
427
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and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to
the operation or organization of the former.”433 Importantly:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by
the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will control each other,
at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.434
In contrast to intragovernmental decision-making tempered by separation of
powers, intergovernmental actions merely need one entity to check the other.435 With
regards to the Import-Export Clause, Madison noted that:
The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports
is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of trade to the federal councils. It is needless, therefore, to remark further on this head, than that the manner
in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once
to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing for
the conveniency of their imports and exports, and to the United
States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion.436
Madison seemed to believe that a state solely needed to receive consent from
Congress. Madison’s understanding seems comparable to his desired congressional
negative.437 As we noted, the three clauses in Article I, Section 10 were discussed
in the context of the Madisonian negative.438 While Madison’s peers rejected the
negative’s goal of reforming the internal police power of the states, they embraced
its second purpose—protecting federal interests—by prohibiting states from taking
certain actions without congressional consent, actions that posed special threats to
federal interests (i.e. laying duties on imports or exports and entering into agreements
with other states).439 Thus, the form of congressional consent under Madison’s proposed congressional negative should inform our understanding of how congressional
consent operates under the Import-Export and Compact Clauses.
433
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438
See discussion supra Section I.A.3.
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Under one version of Madison’s proposed negative, he envisioned that the Senate
alone would exercise the negative.440 Thus, bicameralism was not an essential element
of Madison’s congressional negative,441 and the Senate-only negative certainly would
not have implicated the ORV Clause. As a last-step measure, after the Convention
had already agreed upon equal representation in the Senate, Madison expanded the
negative power to both houses of Congress.442 In this way, “[n]o law or resolution
can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and
then of a majority of the States.”443
Congress cannot commandeer the states to fill the federal coffers—the state
must choose to act, and Congress must give its consent.444 Just as importantly, if
Congress does grant approval to an import or export duty, Congress neither aggrandizes itself at the expense of the President nor encroaches upon the President’s
Executory Interest.445 Thus, according to the Framers’s conception of separation of
powers (as reflected in the proper understanding of the ORV Clause presented in our
analysis of Article V above),446 we should not infer presidential participation in the
Interstitial Import-Export Power. Congressional consent stands on its own without
the need for presentment.447
2. Structural Incompatibility
Supporting the textual analysis is a structural analysis. There is a structural incompatibility between the two constitutional provisions regarding exports—the
limitation on Congress’s taxing power under Article I, Section 9’s Export Clause and
the provisions of Article I, Section 10’s Import-Export Clause.448 The Section 10
Import-Export Clause allows states to “lay . . . Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports”449 with congressional consent; in contrast, Section 9’s Export Clause declares
a flat-out ban: “[n]o Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.”450
We shall show that the absence of presidential participation in the consent process
harmonizes these seemingly contradictory approaches.451
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451

LACROIX, supra note 82, at 150.
See id.
See Kramer, supra note 67, at 652–53.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 281, at 378.
See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
See discussion supra Section II.E.
See discussion supra Section II.F.
See discussion supra Sections II.A, B.
See infra notes 449–50 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 452–71 and accompanying text.
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The Convention debates show that the Framers regarded the Section 9 Export
Clause as an important provision, not an afterthought.452 Since the southern states were
the main exporters of goods, it is unsurprising that the South strongly supported the
clause in an effort to prevent the North from harming the South by taxing its exports.453 Further, the Export Clause imposes a total ban on taxing state exports.454
The Convention debates show that when a delegate sought to allow export taxation
for regulatory purposes rather than revenue-raising purposes, his peers rejected his
proposal—this was to be an absolute prohibition.455 Although the Court has struggled to operationalize the Export Clause in a consistent manner, no one can doubt that
a levy of “one cent per pound of flour exported” violates the clause.456
As Justice Story recognized, the Export Clause and the Port Preference Clause457
worked together to prevent the federal government from utilizing its power either
to harm one state or favor another.458 The power to tax exports or to direct merchants
to enter certain ports could be used to harm certain states.459 The Constitution was
designed to protect the republic and allow its people to flourish.460 It was designed
to allow Congress to cooperate with the States, not punish them. Thus, for taxation/regulation intended to have a localized impact, the Framers disapproved of
unilateral federal action. But the federal government would still need a check on
state import and export policies that would infringe upon the Framers’s vision of a
uniform market and a united front in the face of foreign foes.
The Supreme Court’s application of the Import-Export Clause changed radically
after the Civil War.461 During the antebellum period, the Court prohibited states
from imposing duties on imports or exports to or from sister states and foreign countries.462 The post-War Court, on the other hand, restricted the Clause’s application
to foreign commerce.463
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Erik Jensen, The Export Clause, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 6 (2003).
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from
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Id. at 16. See also United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 873 (1996).
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (“No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to,
or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay Duties in another.”).
458
2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
469–71 (1833).
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See id. at 470.
460
See id. at 471.
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See infra notes 462–76 and accompanying text.
462
See infra notes 464–66 and accompanying text.
463
Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, The Import-Export Clause, And Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155, 159–67 (1999). As the Court developed
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Litigants first invoked the Import-Export Clause in Brown v. Maryland.464 In
Brown, although only dealing with foreign commerce, Marshall opined that “[i]t
may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply
equally to importations from a sister State.”465 “If the tax was laid on the gold or silver
exported,” Justice Taney subsequently wrote, “every one would see that it was repugnant to [the Import-Export Clause].”466
In 1869, the Court changed tact, looking to the contemporary understanding of
the word ‘impost.’467 In Woodruff v. Parham,468 where the Supreme Court reversed its
interpretation of the Import-Export Clause, Justice Miller asserted “that the ‘imposts’
Congress was empowered to lay in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution are ‘limited
to duties on foreign imports.’”469 “If the Import-Export Clause was ‘intended to confer
upon Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods or merchandise carried
from one State into another,’” Justice Miller concluded:
[T]he power conferred is curiously rendered nugatory by [the
Export Clause of Article I, Section 9] which declares that no tax
shall be laid on articles from any State, for no article can be imported from one State into another which is not, at the same time,
exported from the former.470
By limiting the clause’s application to foreign commerce, Justice Miller claimed to
resolve the paradox. But is there a paradox?471
The federal government has power under Article I, Section 8 to lay “imposts.”472
States may lay “imposts” under Article I, Section 10, but only with Congressional
consent.473 Woodruff held that the “imposts” in Article I, Section 8 could only refer
to foreign levies;474 otherwise there would be a paradox. A federal power to tax
under Article I, Section 8 would be inconsistent with a prohibition to tax under
and applied the so-called Dormant Commerce Clause, the narrowing of the Import-Export
Clause had very little effect. See id. at 164.
464
See id. at 160–61.
465
Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted).
466
Id. at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted).
467
Id. at 163.
468
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869).
469
Denning, supra note 463, at 183 (quoting Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123,
132 (1869)).
470
Id. (quoting Woodruff, 75 U.S. at 132).
471
Evidently, Justice Miller did not consider that the provision was designed to allow cooperation between Congress and the states. Id. at 183–84.
472
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
473
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
474
See Denning, supra note 463, at 183.
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Article I, Section 9.475 So, the resolution in Woodruff was to limit the power to tax
“imposts” to foreign levies.476
Does that analysis suggest that states’ power to impose “imposts” is limited to
taxing foreign commerce? If the federal “consent” power conferred in Article I,
Section 10 suggests a federal legislative power akin to the federal taxing power in
Article I, Section 8, then the same conundrum described in Woodruff might exist.
The term “imposts” perhaps should be interpreted similarly if they both apply to the
federal government acting in its legislative capacity.
But that is not the case. The federal “consent” power applies to imposts levied by
states477 and is a federal “checking” power on states. The federal power to “consent,”
as in the Compact Clause context, is not a legislative power in the traditional sense,
triggering presidential participation. Congress’s “checking” or “consent” power
under Article I, Section 10 differs from Congress’s legislative power to tax under
Article I, Section 8.478 The “consent” power does not allow Congress to initiate action, as in a legislative context, only to ratify state action or provide a framework in
which states can act voluntarily, on their own and without federal command.479
This structural analysis reinforces the textual analysis and strongly supports the
insight that Congress’s power to “consent” to state taxation under Article I, Section
10 is not legislative in character and does not need to adhere to the mandates of
presentment. In this regard, this constitutional structural pathway is like the analogous structural pathway of the Compact Clause, in which Congress acts in a manner
other than its legislative capacity; and the safeguards of presentment are inoperative
(as they are in the context of amending the Constitution).480 In sum, there is no violation of separation of powers, as there is no aggrandizement of the power of Congress
nor is there encroachment on the President’s Executory Interest.
H. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 and Presentment: The Interstitial Regulatory
Power
In the last Section, we examined two rationales that support the proposition that
congressional consent under the Import-Export Clause is not subject to presentment
and drew an analogy to Congress’s consent power under the Compact Clause.481 Our
conclusion has been that Congress is allowed to exercise its “consent” power under
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the Compact Clause—what we term the Interstitial Regulatory Power—without
presentment.
We have described and justified Congress’s ability to transform state law into
federal law through Congress’s “consent” power under the Compact Clause.482 This
is a form of “unpreemption,” with state law being transformed by Congressional
consent into federal law in cooperation with states.483 This may seem novel but is
constitutionally justified.484
The President solely has a claim to his Executory Interest on behalf of the federal
government, but does not have a vested right to an expansive regulatory state.485
There are situations, like Metro Washington, where Congress consents to a compact,
but maintains more than the right of congressional oversight, instead creating a
federal Executory Interest.486 In that situation, as the Court rightly ruled, Congress
may not accrete executive power to itself.487 Yet, for compacts that do not create any
Federal Executory Interest, no separation of powers problem exists.
A further justification for exempting the Interstitial Regulatory Power from presentment is the structural incompatibility between the Port Preference Clause and the Compact Clause.488 The Port Preference Clause states, “No Preference shall be given by any
Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another:
nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay Duties
in another.”489 The Port Preference Clause (and the Export Clause) were designed to
prevent the federal legislature from purposefully harming one or several states.490 The
Port Preference Clause prohibits the federal government from giving an explicit preference to one state over another. It does not prohibit a consequence of an otherwise
valid federal action being that commerce is channeled towards one state rather than
another.491 In Wheeling II, the Court recognized Congress may not compel merchants
to enter preferred ports nor grant a special privilege to vessels to enter one state
rather than another.492
482

See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
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Unless Congress explicitly regulates in a manner that discriminates in favor of one
state rather than another, the Court will not invoke the Port Preference Clause to
strike down a federal law.493 Subsequent Courts have affirmed this interpretation of
the Clause holding that “the prohibition of such a preference does not extend to acts
which may directly benefit the ports of one State and only incidentally injuriously
affect those of another, such as the improvement of rivers and harbors, the erection
of light-houses, and other facilities of commerce.”494 More recently, a court noted:
The Port Preference clause has been narrowly construed by the
Supreme Court, so as only to prohibit “positive legislation”
intended to produce “a direct privilege or preference of the ports
of any particular State over those of another” and not “incidental
advantages that might possibly result from the legislation of
congress upon other subjects connected with commerce . . . .”495
Yet, a Constitutional Compact singles out particular states to allow those states to
cooperate in some way that interferes with a federal interest,496 which may include
interfering with the national market. There is no content restriction on compacts, as
they essentially allow a combination of federal powers and state powers. Indeed, as
we saw in Part I, the sole purpose of congressional consent is to protect federal
interests from state encroachment.497 Congressional consent merely provides a shield
for state law to operate. Thus, the constitutional prohibition on forcing vessels
entering the state to pay a duty would not be violated by an interstate compact that
favors certain states over others, as the federal government is not acting in its
legislative capacity.
Take for instance the Northeastern Dairy Compact case.498 In an attempt to increase
prices paid to northeastern dairymen, the Compact Commission essentially established
a tariff that disfavored outside milk producers.499 It was only by direct congressional
action that the Commission could avoid a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.500
If the compacts were treated as part of the traditional federal legislative power, this
would very likely have violated the Port Preference Clause, as it would purposefully
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select certain states for preferential regulatory treatment. Precisely because a Constitutional Compact is a two-tiered legal structure, the constitutional prohibition on
certain federal legislation favoring specific ports is not implicated. Congress is not
acting in an unconstitutional, legislative manner, but merely exercising its “consent”
power—empowering states to act in a way they may not without consent. Congress and
the states coordinate, checking each other, to establish the federal shell, which allows
the states to operate the underlying regime.501 Such an interpretation is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the state consenting function.502 This
result is textually and structurally permissible,503 and (depending on the merits of the
particular compact and its operational provisions) socially desirable.
CONCLUSION
Until now, federal legislation has seemed to be the last word on an issue, preventing further state experimentation and innovation. In the future, if states feel that
current federal law poorly addresses their localized needs and preferences, then they
may petition Congress for the ‘right to try’ an alternative regulatory structure that will
both permit regional cooperation and provide new experiments and experiences from
which new lessons may be learned and new laws may be crafted. In the case of
healthcare reform, for example, with the many competing visions and values, the use
of the Compact Clause can enable the states to try these different regimes. The compact
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Similarly, the rest of the provisions in Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 are balanced in
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on allowing for telemedicine, overcoming state-by-state licensing requirements, is a
constructive illustration.
This approach is justified based on the text of the Constitution, early Congressional practice, and existing case law. Courts have treated Constitutional Compacts
as federal law.504 Article V’s ‘constitutive power’ (amending the Constitution), with
language analogous to the Compact Clause, has historically not involved presidential participation via Presentment, and the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth has so
found.505 More recently, the Supreme Court in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission stated that the state legislature’s consent
power is not subject to state-based presentment, in contrast to a state legislature’s
district line-drawing, which is subject to state-based presentment.506 Based on these
legal principles and precedents, congressional approval of Constitutional Compacts
should similarly not be subjected to presentment. A result would be further support
for state-based experimentation, re-empowering the people and their elected legislative representatives, both at the federal and state level, to pursue the general welfare
in certain measured ways free from federal executive control.
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